As the tensions within the Russian state reached a climax, Yevgheny Prighozin and his men chose to retreat after they were offered a deal by the Russian government for the leaders to be safely transferred to Belarus where they would receive full immunity and for Prighozin’s contractors to be either reinstated into the army or to retire to their houses.
Prighozin declared in a statement that he decided to retreat and call for a truce after the realization that blood would be shed and that was ‘the last thing he wanted’. However, Prighozin was in no position to march on Moscow as he lacked air support and the original estimations of 20,000-50,000 troops were false, in reality, he had around 8,000 soldiers with him. However, Putin gave him a rather fair way out which many people considered out of character, but in reality his hand might have been forced.
In the months prior Russian media has displayed the actions of the Wagner group as heroics and Putin has been criticized for undersupplying the front lines and failing to take a stand of solidarity with the soldiers in the front lines fighting for Russia. Using the Russian Army to attack Wanger and stop their march would have caused a lot of backlash and instability since Wanger soldiers and Russian soldiers fought side by side for months. In addition, Putin couldn’t afford the backlash that would come if he convicted The Wagner Group’s leadership. Furthermore, arresting the mercenaries for treason would be impractical as it would cause strife in the Russian Armed Forces and decreases Russia’s military capabilities. However, with the sudden and out of character de-escalation many critics are speculating that the coup could have been a political ploy. With the relocation of Wanger in Belarus, Putin has strategically managed to relocate the army to his allies border next to Poland and Kyiv. Wanger is also training the weaker Belarusian Armed Forces, possibly foreshadowing a full Belarusian entry in the war. In addition, the Ukrainian Armed Forces, possibly in communication according to some sources attacked certain Russian defensive positions hoping they would be undefended; those positions were later described as traps causing large causalities on Ukraine's side. Wanger and Putin have previously used media to their advantage when Wanger was announcing its lack of bullets. According to a few sources, that was an attempt to trick the Ukrainian Armed Forces to underestimate Wanger in Bakhmut, however, this theory has not been verified.
Putin's treatment to the munity was interpreted by international media and political society as weakness on Putin’s part and inability to control affairs with his own country, let alone internationally. Many critics have pointed out that this coup was done to provoke criticism for Putin and expose his government rather than to overthrow the government.
Co-Author: Christos Ntinoulis